Content Security Policy (CSP) is a HTTP header that instruct the browser to limit resource loading of media, styles and scripts.
As you may know, CSP is not adopted yet by industry. Multiple surveys have already been made about the adoption of the security header [1] [2] [3]. Even so, it does not mean that we cannot prepare ourselves for the technology. For this purpose, we have built a Burp and ZAP extension to automate the most common validations called CSP Auditor.
Tuesday, June 28, 2016
Tuesday, March 22, 2016
XSS for ASP.net developers
As a follow-up to the conference given at Confoo few weeks ago, we are doing a focus article on the same topic. The presentation was giving an overview of the modern XSS attack vectors and filter bypass. In this blog post, we will take a closer look at XSS in the context of .NET applications.
This article is intended to be a simple checklist for ASP.net MVC developers or security auditors. Defensive measures can be put in place at various layers including the template files (Razor or ASPx Forms), the Request Validation feature and the client-side (browser) filters.
This article is intended to be a simple checklist for ASP.net MVC developers or security auditors. Defensive measures can be put in place at various layers including the template files (Razor or ASPx Forms), the Request Validation feature and the client-side (browser) filters.
Wednesday, January 6, 2016
Deserialization Vulnerability : Automating the hunt
At the end of 2015, many Java applications were found vulnerable to a common deserialization bug. It all starts with a presentation at AppSecCali that demonstrate the danger of deserializing user input and having Apache Commons Collections in the classpath [1]. Stephen Breen from Foxglove later publish vulnerabilities with working exploits for WebLogic, WebSphere, JBoss and Jenkins.
This is obviously not the end of the story. While some big names where fixed, other applications open source and proprietary are likely to be vulnerable to the same bug pattern. In fact quickly after Foxglove publication, an advisory was release for ActiveMQ.
Stephen has already described in great detail the detection and exploitation in the context of penetration test. I wanted to provide a small method for scanning proprietary applications looking only at the jar files.
Object deserialisation (*) |
Labels:
dependency,
findsecbugs,
java,
rce,
serialization,
tool,
vulnerability
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