Tuesday, April 13, 2021

Creating A Custom View for WebSocket in ZAP

When we were looking at the interactions between the Outlook and the LinkedIn APIs, we encountered WebSocket communications that used some additional encoding. The encoding was nothing too complex, but it was uncommon. It turned out to be LZip compression. However, the inability to read the content of the requests with Burp, ZAP or Web developer consoles in real-time made it difficult to analyze the API.

While our proxy of choice is usually Burp Suite, it did not allow us to extend WebSocket views. We turn ourselves to the open-source project Zed Attack Proxy. It reveals to be easily extendable for custom WebSocket tooling. In this blog post, we will explain how you can implement your own custom view to display complex WebSocket messages.

Wednesday, April 7, 2021

Deanonymizing LinkedIn Users

In this blog post, we will look at the privacy issues with some of LinkedIn’s external APIs. We will demonstrate how it is possible, with an email address, to find its associated LinkedIn profile. It is also possible from a LinkedIn profile to do the reverse path and find a person’s email address. To execute this deanonymization attack, documented features, like LinkedIn’s integration with Outlook and YahooMail, are used.

This short article is not exactly about a vulnerability. It is about documenting risks that LinkedIn is aware of. Our goal is to educate users about it. Meanwhile, we are going to go over technical details that are not explicitly described in LinkedIn’s online documentation and terms and conditions.

The impact in a nutshell: Your LinkedIn email and phone number can be found by users beyond your first-degree connections.

Tuesday, March 16, 2021

6 ways to enumerate WordPress Users

6 ways to enumerate WordPress Users
If you are testing the security of WordPress websites, you will likely have to look at the REST endpoints. By default, users can be listed with the route “/wp-json/wp/v2/users”. On the latest WordPress version, out of the box, you will get the username and the hashed email. Experienced WordPress administrators and users are aware of the potential disclosure. Therefore, we can see various tutorials online on how to hide this information. The recommended ways are either to disable the REST API completely, install a security plugin which disables the specific route or block specific request paths.

After evaluating hundreds of websites, we can say that rare are the sites that have totally blocked the feature.

Tuesday, March 2, 2021

Emails Disclosure on WordPress

Password brute force is one of the common most attack on WordPress. Only a few hours after the deployment of a new blog, we can see login attempts to /xmlrpc.php or /wp-login.php endpoints. While not being sophisticated, they remain strong attacks as they put pressure on the limited complexity passwords and potential password reuse from users. In this article, we are going to explain how the public
wordpress.com REST API makes it easier for brute-force attacks on millions of WordPress instances managed by wordpress.com or private instances with the Jetpack plugin installed.